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The paper investigates if the provision of financial incentives has an impact on the performance of students in educational
tests. The analysis is based on data from an experiment with high school students which answered multiple choice
items from the TIMS-Study. Like in that study, the setup did not discourage students from guessing. Students with a
salary based on individual performance scored insignificantly better than students with a fixed payout or a payout which
is based on the performance of the entire group. However, incentives have an impact. The group with individualized
payments showed significantly more guessing activities than the others.
Keywords: incentives, education, School accountability, educational tests, TIMSS2 
 
Introduction 
Educational performance tests like the PISA- or the TIMSS-Studies have gained enormous 
attention  both  in  the  academic  literature  and  in  the  general  public.  Increasingly  decision 
makers will be hold to account for the performance of ‘their’ schools in such tests, The US 
“No Child Left Behind”-Act is a prominent example for such a policy. However, from an 
economic point of view it is questionable, if these tests are a suitable controlling instrument. 
Unlike in performance tests for universities, students do not directly benefit from a good test 
score. Hence, those students that take part in the test have no incentive to perform strongly. 
Furthermore, they shift attention from “soft” subjects like history to the hard subjects such as 
Math or the Sciences because these subjects are much more suitable for testing. 
This paper investigates the first problem, the incentive compatibility of performance tests. It is 
not  clear  why  students  actively  collaborate  in,  say,  the  PISA-Study.  These  tests  are 
anonymous so they do not become part of the final school mark
1. Furthermore, the benefits 
derived from an increased reputation of the school induce free-riding. On the cost side, some 
tasks are difficult and require real effort to get the solution. For an international comparison of 
school systems, this argument is of little relevance. Apparently, the students in all countries 
face roughly the same conditions during the tests.  
However,  two  questions  arise.  Firstly,  what  is  the  role  of  motivation  in  these  tests?  For 
example, Finnish students score better in performance tests than their American or German 
counterparts. Yet, it is not clear if they are more (intrinsically) motivated or better educated. 
Furthermore,  the  seemingly  low  level  of  motivation  could  induce  political  manipulation. 
Politicians could provide incentives to the students which are linked to the performance in the 
tests. Hence the second question is, if a change in incentives can lead to different results in 
test scores. This could be helpful for decision makers who face an evaluation. Performance 
related payments may provide a quick and easy instrument to improve the test performance. 
The answer to this second question is not as straight forward as the previous argument has 
implied.  Participation  in  school  performance  tests  is  compulsory  for  all  students  in  the 
selected classes. Hence, the outside option for students is possible an hour of boredom. In this 
case, a math test could be a more interesting alternative even for those students who do not 
like the subject. Secondly, some students may even see the test as a challenge. The test offers 
                                                 
1   However,  it  is fairly possible that  teachers administrators  or politicians  could identify the  actual student 
behind a test. 3 
 
a benchmark which is not set by the school. Hence, it may provide useful information about 
individual ability which is otherwise not available. Deci and Ryan (1985) claim that human 
beings’ “need for competence” is a source of intrinsic motivation equivalent to basic needs for 
autonomy and social relatedness. Psychologist and Sociologists are likely to provide further 
explanations  why  students  are  motivated  to  participate  actively  in  the  test.  Gneezy  and 
Rustichini (2000) find that small incentives lead to lower performance than a plain fixed 
payment. Last, but not least, a technological argument has to be considered. Given the time 
restrictions of the tests there are clear limits for motivation. A student is unlikely to solve a 
mathematical problem if he has received poor,  if any, training in the respective area. So 
whatever the motivation, performance cannot exceed some threshold. Motivation and skills 
are substitutes only to a certain degree.  
Another  accountability  problem  is  related  specifically  to  the  design  of  international 
performance tests. Many test items are multiple-choice problems with a bonus for a correct 
answer but no “malus” for a wrong one
2. This is an invitation to guessing. And even if there 
was a bad consequence for guessing, the students would not face it if they receive no benefits 
or punishments according to their performance. So a bored student may pretend to work and 
just puts some marks on the sheets. For international rankings, guessing is no problem. A 
country full of randomly answering students will not outperform a country full of knowing 
students though the performance gap between both countries may be understated.  
There is a large literature analyzing and interpreting the results of international performance 
studies but little attention has been paid to the role of incentives. Recent exceptions are Figlio 
and Lenny (2007) as well as Lavy (2005) for teacher incentives or Glewwe et al (2003) and 
Lavy (2002) for school or group incentives. De Fraja and Landeras (2006), De Fraja et al 
(2004)  and  Eisenkopf  (2007)  analyse  the  effort  provision  of  students,  however  without 
discussing specific incentives designs.  A thorough analysis of the motivational aspects for the 
students in performance tests is still missing. The objective of this paper is to provide a first 
experimental insight into the impact of incentives (or extrinisic motivation) for students on 
their test performance.  
 
I took math items from the TIMSS-III study for 12
th graders and presented them to Swiss high 
school students. In the first experiment I was able to test for 40 minutes an entire grade (70 
                                                 
2 This holds at least for the TIMSS studies. It is basically impossible to get replicates of the tests since the sheets 
are not published. 4 
 
persons,  with  7  more  persons  missing  at  the  experiment)  from  the  Kantonschule  in 
Kreuzlingen in the canton of Thurgau. These students were in the last week of their 11
th year 
in school. Three arguments show why the exercises are suitable for these students. Firstly, the 
school is highly selective and includes only the top 15-20% of the students in its region.  
Secondly, the school informed me about all areas which had not yet been taught. The relevant 
items were dropped. Thirdly, I took math items from the German test. The Swiss education is 
more intensive. It offers an equivalent degree to the German Abitur in 12, not 13 years.  
These high school students are randomly divided into three groups. Subjects in the first group 
get a fixed payment while subjects in the second group get a (smaller) fixed payment plus a 
variable  individual  payment  which  increases  in  the  performance  of  the  the  subject.  The 
payment of the third group depends on the performance of the entire group. The reason for the 
third  treatment  is  that  individual  performance-based  remunerations  are  very  difficult  to 
implement, given that these tests are not part of the examination and anonymous. Performance 
data for classes or schools are more easily available. 
The results show that incentives change behaviour, but they do not improve the performance. 
Subjects with a higher incentive do not provide significantly more correct answers but they 
are more likely to guess. It is plausible that these results change with the sample-size, but the 
gap between the incentivized and the non-incentivized groups reduces if the performance is 
controlled  for  guessing  activities.  The  results  may  change  with  the  size  of  the  variable 
payment, the length of the experiment and if wrong answers are punished.  
The paper is structured as follows. The following section introduces the experiment in greater 
detail. Section 3 discusses the design and section 4 describes the results, while the concluding 
section summarizes and discusses variations for future research. 
 
1  The experiment 
The experiment took place on the 29
th of June, 2007 in the Kantonschule Kreuzlingen, located 
in the north of the Swiss Canton of Thurgau. The experiment started at 9.25 am in three 
classrooms  of  equal  size.  70  students  from  the  11
th  grade  took  part.  Participation  was 
compulsory for all students of the grade but seven of them did not show up. The participants 
faced  mathematical  multiple-choice  problems  from  the  German  version  of  the  TIMSS-III 
Tests.  These  tests  were  part  of  the  Third  International  Mathematics  and  Science  Study 
(TIMSS), devised and implemented by the International Association for the Evaluation of 5 
 
Educational Achievement (IEA). The number “III” refers to the subpopulation which has been 
examined with this particular set of tests. The subjects were students with 11 or 12 years of 
schooling
3.  I  used  the  exemplary  questions  from  the  Max-Planck  Institute  for  Human 
Development  which  ran  the  study  in  Germany
4.  Unlike  other,  more  recent,  exemplary 
questions these test sheets provided several advantages. They were documented as multiple 
choice questions with all available alternative solutions. Therefore, they were easy to replicate 
and  quick  to  evaluate.  More  importantly,  each  question  included  information  about  its 
difficulty (e.g. the international solution probability or the probability that an average German 
student solved the problem).  
The students were randomly divided into three groups (and the respective rooms) according to 
their  treatment.  The  author  of  this  paper  introduced  the  experiment  and  the  respective 
treatment to each group. One person was in charge of the experiment in each room. These 
“overseers” did not have any a-priori information about the mathematical tasks. The subjects 
were instructed that no questions were admitted once the experiment had begun.  
The mathematical problems and the possible choices were presented in one question sheet. 
The students then marked the chosen solutions had to be marked one a separate response 
sheet.  To  minimize  cheating,  the  students  received  in  two  different  sequences.  Hence 
neighbouring students did not have the same response sheets. The test lasted for 40 minutes. 
After the test, the students answered an additional questionnaire with background information 
and received their payments. All sheets are presented in the appendix. 
 
2  Treatments and Discussion of the Experiment 
The subjects were divided into three different treatment groups. Subjects in treatment group 1 
received a fixed payment of 12 Swiss Francs (CHF, 1 Franc was equivalent to  0.60, US-
$0.81 or £0.41 at this day) and a variable payment of 2 Francs for each correct answer. In 
treatment group 2 all participants received a fixed payment of 20 CHF. The payout in group 3 
depended on the performance of the entire group. If the group was, on average, better than 
both other groups, each group member would have received CHF25. With a “second place”, 
the payout would have been CHF20 and otherwise CHF15. Members of the group were not 
                                                 
3   Sekundarstufe II in the German system. 
4  The  institutes  webpage  says  that  they  are  not  available  but  I  found  the  items  at 
www.timss.mpg.de/Die_Testaufgaben/TIMSS_3-Aufgaben.pdf (last access: July, 30th, 2007) 6 
 
informed  about  the  treatment  of  the  other  groups.  Table  1  shows  the  distribution  of  the 
subjects into the three groups: 
Table 1: The distribution of subjects across treatment groups 
  Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Summary 
Men  12  13  12  37 
Women  9  12  12  33 
Summary  21  25  24  70 
Missing  5  1  1   
  
Since this is the first incentive experiment with schools performance tests and the sample size 
is rather limited, the focus is on two core questions: 
1.  Do incentives matter in performance tests? Here treatment groups 1 and 3 can be 
compared with group 2. 
2.  Does the size of incentives matter? For this question, I compare the results of groups 1 
and 3. 
The explanation focuses on two behavioural variables. The first one is the actual performance, 
i.e. the number of correctly solved puzzles. The second focus looks at guessing behaviour. 
There  are  various  ways  to  identify  guessing.  A  simple  way  is  to  look  at  the  share  of 
unanswered questions among all those questions which are not correctly answered. I will 
discuss the details more deeply in the results section. The two questions can be answered with 
both behavioural variables. 
If the first part of the argument in the introduction is correct then marginal monetary benefits 
matter. Hence group 1 with the variable payments should have the highest average output, 
followed by group 3 and group 2 (with the fixed payment). The same sequence should hold 
with respect to guessing activities, though corner solutions are possible since the marginal 
costs of guessing are very low. 7 
 
The idea behind the experimental approach is to replicate a performance test in a nutshell and 
to  introduce  some  controlled  variations.  In  this  experiment  the  focus  is  on  changes  in 
incentives, while keeping the evaluation system constant. Hence guessing is not punished. 
Prospective research projects will take account of this problem. However, it requires a sample 
size  which  is  larger  than  the  one  available  for  this  experiment.  Table  2  shows  the  four 
necessary treatment groups. Otherwise it is not possible to distinguish the impact of guessing 
and problem solving clearly. 
 
Table 2: Treatment groups for an alternative experiment which controls for guessing 
Incentives; Guessing is not punished  No Incentives; Guessing is not punished 
Incentives; Guessing is punished  No Incentives; Guessing is punished 
  
The possibility for guessing has a methodological advantage. The students have two activities 
at hand, problem solving and guessing. The marginal costs of problem solving are higher than 
the costs of guessing. Hence, if treatment groups do not differ with respect to performance it 
is not clear if this is driven by technological limitations (i.e. more effort is just not enough to 
solve a more difficult problem) or if they do not respond to the incentives, for whatever 
reason. Differences with respect to guessing activities can control for the latter explanation. 
Incentive  group  3  is  debatable,  both  its  existence  and  its  implementation.  Here  the  key 
motivation is to increase the external validity of the experiment. Decision makers are unlikely 
to write binding contracts with individual students with respect to their test performance. The 
most  likely  approach  here  would  be  to  integrate  these  tests  into  the  regular  examination 
process.  Since  tests  are  hitherto  anonymous,  class  or  school  performances  are  the  only 
contractible  measures.  Hence  students  provide  inputs  to  a  club  good.  I  chose  a  relative 
performance measure, not an absolute one but it is not unlikely that this particular setting has 
a great impact on the performance of group members. The same holds for the problem if 
group members should be informed about the treatment of the other groups. Here I chose the 
more parsimonious approach with respect to instruction time.  
3  Results 
The presentation of the results is structured as followed. I will compare the three groups at 
first  with  respect  to  the  performance,  then  with  respect  to  the  guessing  activities  of  the 
subjects.  8 
 
4.1.  Fixed payment (group 2) vs variable payment (group 1) 
The first comparison is between treatment groups 1 and 2, the variable payment versus the 
fixed payments. This is the clearest case to identify if incentives have an impact. The results 
in table 1 show that, on average, students with a variable payment solve one task more than 
their counterparts do (Model 1). This effect is not significant with the given sample size. It 
does not change, if performance in school (schoolmark), performance in math (mathmark) 
and gender are taken into account (Model 2). Note that some students returned incomplete 
questionnaires without math or school marks. 
Table 3: Differences in test performance between treatment groups 1 and 2 
(OLS) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Treatment (0: variable, 1: fixed)  -1.011 (.952)  -1.084 (.878) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  1.642** (.700) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.457 (1.31) 
Gender (0: male; 1: female)    -1.820* (.937) 
Constant  9.571*** ( .702)  -1.820 (.937) 
R   .025  .317 
N  46  42 
Standard Errors in Brackets; Significance levels: ***=.01,**=.05,*=.1 
 
A simple score can be used to identify guessing, the share of unanswered questions among all 
those  questions  which  have  not  been  answered  correctly.  A  high  share  indicates  little 
guessing. Just two persons with variable payments left questions unanswered, compared with 
12 in the fixed pay treatment and 9 in the group pay treatment (treatment group 3). This is an 
indication that guessing occurs in all groups but with some important quantitative differences. 
Table 2 confirms significant guessing differences between the treatment groups. It also shows 
that guessing activity is independent of math ability, which drives test performance. This is an 
indication that guessing and problem solving are neither substitutes nor complements.  9 
 
 
Table 4: Differences in guessing activity between treatment groups 1 and 2 
(OLS) 
Treatment (0: variable, 1: fixed)  -.145*** (.047)  -.157*** (.051) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.004 (.041) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.111 (.077) 
Gender (0: male; 1: female)    .028 (.058) 
Constant  .981*** (.034)  1.497*** (.290) 
R   .180  .246 
N  46  42 
Standard Errors in Brackets; Significance levels: ***=.01,**=.05,*=.1 
 
High guessing activities indicate that just counting the number of correct answers overstates 
the performance. The data show similar results. For example, an estimation of model 1 from 
table 3 with the guess share as control variable reduces the average performance gap between 
both treatment groups to 0.889 tasks (standard error 1.06). 
4.2.  Group payment (group 3) vs fixed payment (group 2) 
I  repeat  the  same  analysis  but  replace  treatment  group  1  with  treatment  group  3.  The 
difference between the two analyzed groups is not significant. In this case, a much larger 
increase in the sample size would be necessary to get a significant treatment. If anything, the 
treatment effect is likely to be smaller. 10 
 
 
Table 5: Differences in test performance between treatment groups 2 and 3 
(OLS) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Treatment (0: fixed; 1: Group)  -.227 (.812)  .148 (.690) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  2.082*** (.605) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.924 (1.268) 
Gender (0: male; 1: female)    -1.631** (.742) 
Constant  8.787*** ( 1.276)  4.241 (4.536) 
R   .002  .406 
N  49  47 
Standard Errors in Brackets; Significance levels: ***=.01,**=.05,*=.1 
 
The  difference  in  guessing  behaviour  is  also  insignificant.  The  subjects  with  the  group 
payment treatment do not guess more tasks than their counterparts do.  
Table 6: Differences in guessing activity between treatment groups 2 and 3 
(OLS) 
Treatment (0: fixed, 1: Group)  -.007 (.067)  -.000*** (.076) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  .001 (.058) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.088 (.117) 
Gender (0: male; 1: female)    -.0.37 (.075) 
Constant  .844*** (.098)  1.249*** (.393) 
R   .180  .246 
N  49  47 




4.3.  Group  payment  (group  3)  and  fixed  payment  (group  2)  vs  variable  payment 
(group 1) 
Since the treatment groups 2 and 3 hardly differ in both performance and guessing activities it 
is clear that a comparison between groups 2 and 3 yields similar than those documented in 
subsection 4.1. Hence, if the treatments do not differ, it is possible to control the performance 
of the variable payment group against the performance of the other groups. The treatment 
effect is still insignificant but the standard error is smaller.  
 
Table 7: Differences in test performance between variable payment (group 1) 
and fixed and group payments (groups 1 and 3)  (OLS) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Treatment (0: variable, 1: other)  -1.122 (.774)  -1.109 (.702) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  1.724*** (.528) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
  -.558 (1.080) 
Gender (0: male; 1: female)    -1.534** (.679) 
Constant  9.571*** (.648)  5.426 (4.015) 
R   .030  .321 
N  70  65 
Standard Errors in Brackets; Significance levels: ***=.01,**=.05,*=.1 
 
The results show substantial gender differences. The treatment effect is significant for female 
participants  but  not  for  male  ones.  However,  the  treatment  effect  is  insignificant  once 
guessing has been taken into account. It is clear that guessing enhances the test performance.  12 
 
 
Table 7: Differences in test performance between variable payment (group 1) 
and fixed and group payments (groups 1 and 3)  (only women, OLS) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Treatment (0: variable, 1: other)  -1.561* (.915)  -.817 (.866) 
Mathmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
. 138 (.813)  .095 (.732) 
Schoolmark (from 1.0 (very bad) to 6.0 
(very good)) 
-1.650 (1.318)  -1.008 (1.208) 
Guess  share  (from  1.0  (high)  to  0.0 
(low))  
  4.607***(1.653) 
Constant  9.571*** (.648)  5.426 (4.015) 
R   .030  .321 
N  70  65 
Standard Errors in Brackets; Significance levels: ***=.01,**=.05,*=.1 
Furthermore, the treatment groups do not differ at different levels of difficulty. Graph 1 shows 
on the ordinate the solution probability for each task in the variable treatment group, the two 
other treatment groups and the international solution probability. The easier problems are on 
the right side of the abscissa. 
Graph 1: The performance of the treatment groups across the difference items (Ordinate: 




The guessing activities differ significantly between the treatment groups, the treatment effect, 
controlled for all variables from tables 4 and 6, is -.149, (standard error: .0581) 
4  Summary and Conclusion 
The paper analysed the results from an experiment with high school students on the role of 
incentives in educational performance tests. The experimental setup was based on multiple 
choice items from international educational tests. Like in those tests, the experimental setup 
did not discourage the students from guessing. Students with a salary based on individual 
performance scored insignificantly better than students with a fixed payout or a payout which 
is  based  on  the  performance  of  the  entire  group.  However,  the  former  group  showed 
significantly  more  guessing  activities  than  the  others,  which  is  a  clear  observation  that 
students  respond  to  incentives.  These  guessing  activities  also  explain  a  good  part  of  the 
differences between the treatment groups.  
The results show that it needs, at the very least, large individual incentives and a large student 
body to generate a better test score. Higher effort can substitute skills only to a certain extent. 
The  guessing  activities  show  that  multiple  choice  questions  have  a  clear  drawback  once 
decision makers induce students to perform strongly in the tests. The recent TIMSS- and 
PISA  tests  include  items  which  tell  the  students  to  show  the  way  they  have  solved  the 
problem. Once these tasks have an adequate weight and independent evaluation is ensured, 
performance tests are better, i.e. more incentive compatible, accountability instruments.  
The focus of this experiment was to generate evidence which provides sufficient external 
validity given the time and sample size constraints. Future research should investigate more 
on  the  relationship  between  guessing  and  problem  solving.  An  adequate  design  has  been 
introduced  in  this  paper.  Such  research  could  provide  evidence  if  both  activities  are 
substitutes or complements. In the first case, a lack of punishment for wrong answer could 
induce students to guess rather than to investigate the problem. In the second case, guessing 
would encourage calculations because the risks from a small error in the calculus are smaller. 
I plan to implement such an experiment with a similar pool of subjects this autumn, such that 
a future version of this paper will include the results. 
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